The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy by Stout, Lynn A.
  
 
(2003) 
RESPONSE 
THE TOXIC SIDE EFFECTS OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
LYNN A. STOUT† 
In response to Barry E. Adler & Marcel Kahan, The Technology of 
Creditor Protection, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1773 (2013), and Edward B. Rock, 
Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907 
(2013). 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 2003 
I. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AS ACADEMIC  
CENTRAL PLANNING .............................................................. 2005 
II. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY BECOMES DOGMA ........................... 2007 
III. SHAREHOLDER NIRVANA THREATENS  
CREDITOR WELFARE .............................................................. 2010 
IV. MORE TOXIC SIDE EFFECTS FROM SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY: 
DAMAGE TO STAKEHOLDERS OTHER THAN CREDITORS ......... 2012 
V. STILL MORE TOXIC SIDE EFFECTS: UNLEASHING  
SHAREHOLDER SHORT-TERMISM ........................................... 2016 
CONCLUSION: IS SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY TOO TOXIC? ............... 2019 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The past two decades have seen a dramatic shift in the corporate land-
scape.1 For most of the twentieth century, well into the early 1990s, directors 
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1 This shift has been analyzed in a number of recent publications. See, e.g., GERALD F. DAVIS, 
MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RESHAPED AMERICA 59-101 (2009); Edward B. 
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and executives of large U.S. corporations saw themselves as stewards of 
great economic institutions that should serve not only equity investors but 
also customers, creditors, employees, suppliers, and the broader society.2 
Today this “managerialist” philosophy is viewed as obsolete and inefficient. 
Many, and possibly most, public companies now embrace a shareholder-
centered vision of good corporate governance that emphasizes “maximizing 
shareholder value” (typically measured by share price) over all other 
corporate goals.3 
What have been the practical results of the shift? The philosophy of 
“shareholder primacy” overtook managerialism in large part because it was 
thought to offer a cure for the “agency cost” problem of corporate managers 
neglecting shareholders’ interests in order to serve their own. Today, many 
argue that the shareholder primacy cure has largely succeeded in eliminating 
any significant divide between managers’ and shareholders’ interests.4 
Institutional shareholders in particular enjoy more influence over corporate 
boards today than at any other time in American business history, and 
executives are far more focused on keeping share prices high. 
Yet there are signs that the shareholder primacy cure has troubling side 
effects. This concern provides the basis for the two Articles reviewed in this 
Response: one by Edward Rock and the other by Barry Adler and Marcel 
Kahan.5 These Articles point out that increasing shareholders’ influence in 
public companies and driving managers to focus on share price to the 
exclusion of other considerations can help shareholders by harming corpo-
rate creditors. Each Article offers novel and plausible approaches for 
ameliorating this negative, creditor-damaging side effect of shareholder 
primacy. 
This Response applauds both Articles, but it also suggests that we 
should further expand the inquiry into shareholder primacy’s negative 
consequences. There is reason to fear that the side effects of the shareholder 
 
Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907 (2013); Lynn A. 
Stout, On The Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the 
Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1177-78 (2013).  
2 See Rock, supra note 1, at 1912-17; Stout, supra note 1, at 1170-72.  
3 See Rock, supra note 1, at 1910 (“[S]ince the early 1980s, the U.S. system has shifted from a 
manager-centric system to a shareholder-centric system.”); Stout, supra note 1, at 1177-78 (describ-
ing “how shareholder primacy managed so swiftly to mature from provocative academic theory to 
conventional wisdom”).  
4 See Rock, supra note 1, at 1910 (“With respect to the most important decisions . . . there is 
substantial reason to believe that managers and directors today largely ‘think like shareholders.’”). 
5 Barry E. Adler & Marcel Kahan, The Technology of Creditor Protection, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1773 (2013); Rock, supra note 1.  
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primacy cure are more toxic than these two Articles suggest. Indeed, they 
may be threatening the health of the corporate patient.  
I. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AS ACADEMIC CENTRAL PLANNING 
The public corporation as we know it—that is, the large, publicly listed 
company with professional management and dispersed shareholders—first 
emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century. For most of that 
century, shareholders remained dispersed and passive, exercising little or no 
influence over boards of directors. In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means 
famously documented this pattern of the “separation of ownership from 
control.”6 Far from being held under shareholders’ collective thumbs, boards 
of directors in public firms operated as self-selecting and autonomous 
decisionmaking bodies. They did not privilege shareholders’ interests or the 
idea of “shareholder value” over the interests of other corporate stakeholders, 
such as customers, creditors, employees, and the local community. While 
shareholders were treated as an important corporate constituency, they were 
not the only constituency that mattered. Nor was share price viewed as a 
reliable proxy for corporate performance. 
Managerialism appears to have first come under attack and the idea of 
shareholder primacy seems to have first gained traction in academia. This 
began during the 1970s with the rise of the Chicago school of free-market 
economics and its intellectual cousin, the “law and economics” movement.7 
In 1970, Milton Friedman published a famous essay in the New York Times 
Magazine arguing that the only proper goal of business (which he seemed to 
view as synonymous with large corporations) was the pursuit of profit for 
the company’s owners (which he assumed to be its shareholders).8 In 1976, 
 
6 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1939) (noting that public corporations are characterized by “a large 
measure of separation of ownership and control”). As discussed in greater detail later, see infra text 
accompanying note 45, the statement that “ownership” and “control” are separated in public 
corporations reflects a mistaken notion that shareholders somehow “own” corporations. In fact, as 
the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010), 
corporations are independent legal entities that own themselves. This legal reality has important 
economic consequences that we gloss over at our peril. 
7 See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS 
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 15-23 (2012) (discussing the rise 
of shareholder primacy theory in academia); see also DAVIS, supra note 1, at 81 (“From an economic 
point of view, the idea of managerialism was intolerable . . . .”). 
8 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32. Davis traces the intellectual roots of shareholder primacy theory back 
even further to Henry Manne, who was “one of the leading lights of the ‘law and economics’ 
movement” and his 1965 writings on “the market for corporate control.” DAVIS, supra note 1, at 81 
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Michael Jensen and William Meckling published an influential article on 
the “theory of the firm,” which is still the most frequently cited academic 
article in the managerial literature today.9 Jensen and Meckling argued that 
the main problem in firms was coercing wayward professional managers 
(whom the authors called agents) to faithfully serve the interests of the 
firm’s owners (so-called principals). Like Friedman, Jensen and Meckling 
treated the concepts of the “firm” and the “corporation” as synonyms, and 
they assumed that the shareholders were the corporation’s owners and 
residual claimants.10 
Jensen and Meckling’s article was eagerly embraced by a rising genera-
tion of corporate legal scholars.11 Yet there are at least two odd aspects to 
legal scholars’ enthusiasm for the “agency cost” approach to understanding 
the nature of corporate law. First, the classic agency cost model relied on 
patently inaccurate assumptions about the legal structure of corporations. 
As a legal matter, directors are not agents subject to shareholders’ control; 
nor do shareholders own corporations, which are legal entities that “own” 
themselves; nor are shareholders the sole residual claimants of functioning 
public companies, although they can come close to that status in insolvent 
firms.12 Because Friedman, Meckling, and Jensen were economists, and not 
lawyers, they were perhaps understandably ignorant of the complex web of 
rights and responsibilities that comprise the modern public company. This 
ignorance allowed them to assume that large public corporations were 
simply larger versions of the familiar sole proprietorship or small, closely-
held company.13 But it is curious that scholars with formal legal training 
(including, for many years, the Author) so easily accepted their views. 
 
(discussing Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 
(1965). Rock emphasizes the role of Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s 1976 article. Rock, 
supra note 1, at 1913 (discussing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)). 
9 ROGER L. MARTIN, FIXING THE GAME: BUBBLES, CRASHES, AND WHAT CAPITALISM 
CAN LEARN FROM THE NFL 10-13 (2011). 
10 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 309 (“[T]he relationship between the stockholders 
and manager of a corporation fit[s] the definition of a pure agency relationship . . . .”).  
11 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF CORPORATE LAW 9 (1991); RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS 
OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 10-66 (1980). 
12 See infra text accompanying notes 45-48.  
13 A similar lack of legal sophistication explains why many who defend shareholder primacy 
in public corporations rely on dicta from the antiquated Michigan corporate law case of Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), to argue that corporate law mandates shareholder 
primacy. Dodge was primarily a close corporation case, and it has been cited by modern Delaware 
courts only in that context. However, in modern public corporations, the business judgment rule 
leaves boards with ample room to pursue corporate objectives other than increasing shareholder 
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The second odd aspect of the law and economics approach to corporate 
governance is that it led many emerging corporate scholars to believe that 
managerialism was outmoded and inefficient and that corporate law and 
practice needed reform from the outside.14 In other words, economic 
analysis led many legal experts to conclude that academics had better 
insight into how to run businesses than businesspeople themselves; that the 
voluntary contractual arrangements of atomized individuals were inferior to 
mandatory governance rules imposed by reformers and regulators; and that 
uniform, “one size fits all” practices produced better corporate governance 
than diverse, individualized arrangements. Such beliefs are anathema to 
free-market economists like Friedrich Hayek, who placed far more faith in 
voluntary arrangements that evolve naturally from the needs of atomistic 
individuals in the business world than attempts at the “intelligent design” of 
institutions by bureaucrats or academics.15 Nevertheless, embracing economic 
analysis led many legal scholars to attempt the academic equivalent of 
bureaucratic central planning in corporate governance. 
Despite the shaky intellectual foundations of shareholder primacy theory, 
the shareholder primacy theorists had impeccable timing. By the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, managerialism—which had dominated the business world 
for more than half a century—had become suddenly and uniquely vulnera-
ble to critique. This vulnerability can be traced to two developments: the 
1973–74 bear market, and corporate raiders discovery that the stock market 
often undervalued the conglomerate business structure that many manageri-
alist boards and executives had favored.16 
II. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY BECOMES DOGMA 
It is worth noting that managerialist practices did not cause the 1973–74 
bear market, which saw the Dow Jones Industrial Average lose nearly forty 
percent of its value. Managerialism, after all, had been around for more 
than half a century. The Arab oil embargo, which quadrupled oil prices, and 
Richard Nixon’s inflation-triggering decision to take the United States off 
 
wealth. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 
168-72 (2008) (“[C]ourts regularly allow corporate directors to make business decisions that harm 
shareholders in order to benefit other corporate constituencies.”).  
14 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923 
(1984) (discussing calls for reform). 
15 See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 88-100 (1944) (arguing for the supe-
riority of economic freedom over central planning). 
16 See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 81-87 (discussing how the conglomerate trend opened manageri-
alism to criticism and the chronic undervaluation of corporations); Stout, supra note 1, at 1172-73 
(discussing the role of the 1973–74 bear market).  
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the gold standard were far more plausible causes of the market decline.17 
Still, the stock market’s abysmal performance during the early 1970s opened 
the door to doubts about managerialism’s efficacy. 
Similarly, the discovery that the stock market tended to undervalue large 
conglomerates comprised of many different business divisions, relative to 
the price the market attached to those business divisions when trading as 
freestanding entities, provided highly questionable evidence that manageri-
alism was inefficient in any sense other than the very narrow sense of 
maximizing current share price.18 The 1980s, however, were the heyday of a 
particularly extreme version of the “efficient market hypothesis” that held 
that stock prices always reflected true economic value.19 Thus, the phenom-
enon of conglomerate undervaluation was viewed at the time as prima facie 
evidence that large conglomerates were poorly run.20 Today, it is widely 
understood that stock market prices can deviate significantly from underlying 
value21 and that shares in diversified conglomerates often trade at a discount 
that does not necessarily reflect diminished operating performance.22 
Whatever the limits of conglomerate discounts and the 1973–74 bear 
market as evidence of managerialism’s supposed inefficiency, by the mid-
1980s, many shareholders in public companies had become disillusioned. 
Some shareholders, such as corporate raiders Carl Icahn, T. Boone Pickens, 
and Ronald Perelman, saw opportunities to profit from buying stock in 
conglomerate firms and then pressuring their boards to break them up and 
sell off their pieces. This set the stage for the ascent of shareholder primacy, 
as academic shareholder-primacy advocates in the ivory towers gained a 
powerful ally in the form of shareholders (especially “activist” shareholders) 
themselves. 
Rock’s Article provides an excellent account of how lobbying efforts by 
academics and shareholder activists changed corporate law and practice over 
 
17 See OPEC Oil Embargo, 1973–1974, U.S. DEP’T ST.: OFF. HISTORIAN, http://history.state. 
gov/milestones/1969-1976/OPEC (last visited May 6, 2013).  
18 See Peter G. Klein, Were the Acquisitive Conglomerates Inefficient?, 32 RAND J. ECON. 745, 
745-47 (2001) (challenging the idea that conglomerates are “per se inefficient”).  
19 See infra text accompanying notes 64-66.  
20 Rock, supra note 1, at 1925 (discussing how premiums paid in buyouts were assumed to be 
evidence of managerial costs and how “[i]t is now clear that there are a variety of explanations for 
premiums”). 
21 See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the 
New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 639-50 (2003) (explaining the “limits of orthodox efficient 
market theory”); infra text accompanying notes 64-66.  
22 Perhaps the best explanation for this phenomenon was offered by Edward Miller in his 
famous paper Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151, 1162-64 (1977). 
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time.23 They shifted the U.S. corporate system away from what Rock calls a 
“manager-centric system” in the 1980s to the “shareholder-centric system” 
we see today.24 Rather than repeat his analysis, this Response highlights 
three particularly significant changes in corporate law and practice that 
played large roles in creating what Rock calls the “new shareholder-centric 
reality.”25 
The first was a 1993 change in the tax code that encouraged public cor-
porations to tie executive pay to “objective” performance metrics.26 Share-
holder primacy theory suggested the obvious metric should be share price. 
The 1993 tax code change thus dramatically shifted the manner in which 
most public corporations paid their top executives: it encouraged wide-
spread use of stock options and stock grants, which eventually ensured that 
executives’ interests in raising share price thoroughly overshadowed their 
salary interests. As Rock correctly observes, today there is no longer any 
“empirical basis for assuming any general divergence between the CEO’s 
incentives and shareholder value.”27 
The second change was the increasing clout that mutual funds, pension 
funds, and hedge funds enjoyed over boards of directors, due in large part to 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule changes in the 1990s and 
early 2000s designed to promote greater “shareholder democracy.”28 Exam-
ples include the 1992 changes to the proxy rules, which allowed activist 
hedge funds (the descendants of the 1980s corporate raiders) to coordinate 
and communicate with each other;29 the 2003 adoption of NYSE and 
NASDAQ listing standards requiring public companies to have a majority 
of independent directors;30 and a 2004 SEC rule requiring mutual funds to 
publicly disclose how they vote shares in their portfolios.31 
 
23 Rock, supra note 1, at 1910. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(c) (2006) (permitting deductions for certain performance-based 
compensation).  
27 Rock, supra note 1, at 1919. 
28 Because institutional investors have large and relatively concentrated shareholdings, they 
can better overcome the rational apathy that discourages small retail investors from becoming 
involved in corporate governance. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist 
Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1274-83 (2008); Rock, supra note 1, at 1922.  
29 Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 28, at 1276-77. 
30 Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48745, 68 Fed. Reg. 218 (Nov. 
4, 2003). 
31 See generally Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: 
The Case for Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 384 (2009). Prior to 2004, 
most mutual fund managers routinely voted as incumbent boards recommended. After 2004, the 
vast majority have “outsourced” their voting decisions to commercial proxy advisory services, 
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Finally, a third change that greatly advanced the shareholder primacy 
agenda was a fundamental shift in business leaders’ subjective beliefs about 
the purpose of public corporations—to maximize shareholder wealth, of 
course. As shareholder primacy theory was embraced by professors in 
economics departments and in law and business schools in the 1970s and 
1980s, those professors in turn taught its precepts to their students. Those 
students eventually became today’s CEOs, directors, investment managers, 
policymakers, and regulators. Thus, shareholder primacy has become 
dogma: a belief system so widely accepted that most of those who embrace 
it cannot recall where they first learned of it or explain what evidence 
supports it over other theories.32 
The result of these developments is that the idea of the managerial cor-
poration is, as Rock cogently states, “dead and should be buried. Managers 
now largely think and act like shareholders.”33 What modern academics long 
viewed as the core problem of corporate law—the agency cost problem of 
self-interested managers exploiting powerless shareholders—“has largely 
been solved.”34 So where do we go from here? 
III. SHAREHOLDER NIRVANA THREATENS CREDITOR WELFARE 
People—including professors—are creatures of habit. Corporate scholars 
whose writing has focused for decades on the problem of managerial 
malfeasance may be easily tempted to simply keep doing what they have 
always done. That is, they may continue assuming that the primary problem 
we need to address in public corporations is still managers exploiting 
shareholders, and that public corporations need an even stronger dose of the 
shareholder primacy cure.35 Rock and Adler and Kahan deserve great praise 
for being more observant. They recognize that the corporate landscape has 
changed. Rather than ruminating over old, well-chewed problems, they look 
ahead to identify the challenges that the new terrain presents. 
And they see challenges. The Articles by Rock and by Adler and Kahan 
are pioneering contributions to what seems likely to prove an emerging new 
literature in corporate governance. In this new literature, the focus of 
 
especially Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), which often embrace shareholder primacy 
ideals. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 28, at 1277-78.  
32 See STOUT, supra note 7, at 21. 
33 Rock, supra note 1, at 1988.  
34 Id. at 1909. 
35 See id. at 1925 (referring to “[a]cademics’ stubborn focus on the ‘problem’ of managerial 
resistance”). 
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attention will shift away from conflicts between the interests of corporate 
managers and those of shareholders. Adler and Kahan believe that this shift 
will occur not only because “the agency costs between a firm’s shareholders 
and its managers have recently declined.”36 It will also occur because the 
very developments that have reduced the shareholder–manager conflict have 
worsened a different conflict: the conflict between creditors and shareholders.37 
Corporate nirvana for shareholders, as Rock and Adler and Kahan point 
out, can be hazardous to creditors’ financial health. In making this observation, 
they remind readers of a basic reality of the institutional complexity we call 
a corporation. If the corporation (as economists like to say) is a “nexus of 
contracts,” many of those contracts (as economists also like to say) are 
seriously “incomplete.” Creditors—at least, voluntary creditors—can 
bargain with the firm and try to negotiate detailed debt covenants that 
protect them against foolish or opportunistic corporate behavior. But, given 
the substantial costs of contracting, the impossibility of predicting all 
possible future changes in circumstances, and the riskiness of relying on 
imperfectly informed outside observers like courts to enforce contractual 
provisions, it is inevitable that circumstances may arise where boards can 
make decisions that threaten corporate creditors’ interests, and debt con-
tracts will not clearly and completely control board behavior.38 
This means that how a board of directors chooses to run a corporation 
has a substantial effect not only on shareholders’ but also creditors’ welfare. 
For example, a board of directors can choose to avoid risky business pro-
jects, refuse to “leverage” the firm by taking on additional debt, and hoard 
its cash rather than pay out dividends or repurchase shares. Each of these 
business strategies benefits creditors by reducing the chance of insolvency. 
Conversely, a board can embrace risky new ventures, borrow wildly, and pay 
lavish dividends. These strategies all increase shareholders’ expected returns 
while reducing creditors’ chances of repayment. 
The result, as Adler and Kahan discuss, is that “the interests of share-
holders and those of creditors sometimes conflict.”39 There is a tension 
between the way creditors would like boards to run firms and the way 
shareholders would like boards to run firms. A necessary corollary is that 
changes in corporate law and practice that make boards more attentive to 
shareholders’ interests can prove harmful to creditors. As Rock notes, 
 
36 Adler & Kahan, supra note 5, at 1775. 
37 Id. at 1775-76; Rock, supra note 1, at 1926-29. 
38 See LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 
178-81 (2011) (discussing reasons why virtually all contracts are incomplete to some degree). 
39 Adler & Kahan, supra note 5, at 1777. 
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“When shareholders are in control . . . there is less reason to worry about 
shareholder–manager agency costs. But the downside of shareholder control 
is that the incentive to externalize risk onto creditors comes to the fore.”40  
The problem is more than theoretical. Rock’s Article cites several empir-
ical studies that support the view that changes in corporate law and practice 
that have caused boards and executives to focus more on shareholder wealth 
have had negative effects on bondholders.41 Rock also provides a detailed 
case study of Dynegy, Inc. to illustrate how Dynegy’s shareholders sought to 
extract “shareholder value” at the expense of Dynegy’s creditors.42 
Having shown that moving toward a more shareholder-centric system of 
corporate governance has put creditors at risk, Rock and Adler and Kahan 
all offer concrete suggestions for addressing this emerging problem. Rock 
surveys some common contractual solutions to the creditor–shareholder 
conflict. He also insightfully analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of 
creditors’ various existing legal protections, including fraudulent conveyance 
law, legal limits on dividends and corporate repurchases, and different 
understandings of directors’ duty of loyalty and duty to obey the law.43 
Adler and Kahan offer a novel and creative proposal by arguing that we 
should expand creditors’ remedies against third parties, including creating 
notice procedures analogous to those already employed by secured creditors.44  
Both Rock’s analysis and Adler and Kahan’s proposal have several 
strengths. This Response suggests that they also share one significant 
weakness. In brief, they do not go far enough. Thus, the remainder of this 
Response argues that we should consider an alternative approach to the 
problem of dealing with shareholder primacy’s toxic side effects and stop 
asking public corporations to take the shareholder primacy cure. 
IV. MORE TOXIC SIDE EFFECTS FROM SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY: 
DAMAGE TO STAKEHOLDERS OTHER THAN CREDITORS 
When asked to explain exactly why corporations should focus solely on 
maximizing shareholder value, nonexperts typically default to empirically 
false claims like “shareholders own corporations” or “the law says corporations 
 
40 Rock, supra note 1, at 1928. 
41 Id. at 1928-29. 
42 Id. at 1966-77. 
43 See id. at 1944. 
44 Adler & Kahan, supra note 5, at 1797. 
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must maximize profits for shareholders.”45 More sophisticated shareholder 
primacy advocates typically rely on a different factual assertion: that 
shareholders are the sole “residual claimants” in corporations.46 According 
to this view, because the claims that nonshareholders such as creditors, 
employees, or taxing authorities have against corporations are fixed by 
contract or by law, maximizing the value of the shareholders’ residual 
interest in the corporation is equivalent to maximizing the value of the 
corporation itself, which in turn maximizes social value.47 
The shareholders-are-the-residual-claimants argument has its roots in 
bankruptcy law. At least in theory, when an insolvent company is liquidated, 
shareholders receive any assets remaining in the firm after the legal and 
contractual claims of other stakeholder groups (employees, creditors, 
suppliers, and government tax collectors) have been paid in full.48 As both 
Rock’s and Adler and Kahan’s discussions of the tension between shareholders’ 
and creditors’ interests implicitly admit, however, it is not accurate to treat 
shareholders as the sole residual claimants in a company that is not insol-
vent. In fact, outside the bankruptcy context, it is highly misleading to 
suggest that shareholders are legally entitled to receive each and every 
penny of corporate profit left over after the fixed claims of other stakehold-
ers have been paid. To the contrary, the corporation as a legal entity is its 
own residual claimant, with legal title to its profits; shareholders are only 
legally entitled to whatever dividends the board of directors might, in its 
business judgment, declare. The interests of creditors, employees, suppliers, 
and taxing authorities are likewise neither fixed nor static. In solvent 
corporations, the business judgment rule gives boards legal discretion at any 
time to increase employee salaries and benefits, treat suppliers more 
generously, retain earnings to give creditors a larger “equity cushion,” or 
decline to pursue aggressive tax-avoidance strategies. 
 
45 The Author has explained at length elsewhere why each of these claims is false. See 
STOUT, supra note 7, at 24-46. In brief, corporations are legal entities that own themselves; 
shareholders merely own a contract with the corporation called a “share,” just as bondholders own 
a contract with the firm called “debt.” Similarly, the vast majority of corporate charters state that 
the company was formed to do “anything lawful.” In addition, the business judgment rule grants 
boards the legal discretion to pursue a wide range of corporate goals beyond shareholder wealth.  
46 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 36 (in “ordinary” circumstances, “em-
ployees and debt investors hold[] rights to fixed payoffs and equity investors hold[] a residual 
claim to profits, which the other participants promise to maximize”). 
47 Id.  
48 However, empirical corporate law scholar Lynn LoPucki has found that shareholders are 
not always treated as residual claimants even in bankruptcy. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Myth of the 
Residual Owner: An Empirical Study, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1343 (2004) (concluding that “no 
identifiable, single residual owner class exists in most reorganizing large public companies”). 
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In other words, as discussed earlier, the contracts that corporations as 
legal entities enter into with counterparties are always, to a lesser or greater 
extent, incomplete. Moreover, corporations have noncontractual legal 
obligations (for example, to tort victims and taxing authorities) that are 
fluid and uncertain. Finally, corporations can and often do provide non-
contractual and nonlegal external benefits to third parties, from voluntary 
charitable contributions to local communities, to the development of 
innovative technologies that benefit future generations. 
This means that, as an empirical matter, large public corporations have 
many different residual claimants, in the sense that many different individuals 
and groups suffer or benefit from the way the corporation’s board of direc-
tors chooses to exercise its business judgment. Indeed, there is reason to 
suspect that nonshareholders’ interests in how public companies operate 
significantly outweigh shareholders’ interests. 
This point becomes apparent when examining the earnings statement of 
almost any large public corporation. Over the course of a year, a functioning 
public company may make dividend payments to shareholders or retain 
profits that (indirectly and unpredictably) contribute to “shareholder 
wealth” by raising share price. But any dividends paid or earnings retained 
by the corporation are typically grossly outweighed by the payments the 
corporation makes to debtholders, employees, suppliers, and the taxing 
authorities. They are also grossly outweighed by the market value of the 
goods and services the corporation provides to another essential stakeholder 
group: customers. 
As an example, consider the 2011 earnings statement of Abbott Labora-
tories, a publicly traded pharmaceutical company.49 In 2011, Abbott reaped 
$4.7 billion in net earnings that could, if the Abbott board so decided, be 
paid out as dividends to shareholders.50 (In fact, Abbott paid only $2.9 
billion in dividends.51) Yet in the same year, Abbott paid $33 billion to its 
employees and suppliers, as reflected in its reported operating costs.52 It also 
 
49 ABBOTT LABS., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT: CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF EARNINGS, 
available at http://www.abbott.com/static/content/microsite/annual_report/2011/01_earnings_statement. 
php (last visited May 6, 2013). The Author selected Abbott Labs at random from an alphabetized 
list of publicly traded pharmaceutical companies and believes its payment pattern is typical of 
many large public corporations. 
50 ABBOTT LABS., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT: CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS, 
available at http://www.abbott.com/static/content/microsite/annual_report/2011/03_cash_flows.php 
(last visited May 6, 2013).  
51 Id. 
52 ABBOTT LABS., supra note 49. 
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paid $530 million in interest to creditors and $470 million in taxes.53 Finally, 
Abbott also sold $38.9 billion in medical devices, prescription drugs, and 
nutritional products to consumers who presumably benefited from these 
products.54 
As both Rock’s and Adler and Kahan’s Articles  illustrate, shareholder-
centric management practices that benefit the Abbott shareholders, who 
received $2.9 billion in dividends in 2011, may harm the Abbott bondholders 
who received $530 million in interest. But because Abbott’s contracts are 
incomplete and its legal obligations and the external benefits it provides are 
not fixed and immutable, shareholder-centric practices may also pose a 
potential threat to the much larger interests, measured by financial flows, of 
Abbott’s employees, suppliers, customers, and taxing authorities. 
By offering solutions to the shareholder–creditor conflict, which they 
argue is worsened when managers focus on “shareholder value,” Rock’s and 
Adler and Kahan’s Articles thus offer solutions to only one, possibly minor, 
negative side effect of the shift to shareholder-centric corporate governance. 
While shareholder primacy may allow shareholders to do only a little better 
at the expense of creditors, it may allow shareholders to do a lot better at 
the expense of employees, suppliers, consumers, local communities, and the 
Internal Revenue Service.  
This raises problems of efficiency as well as equity. In the context of the 
shareholder–creditor conflict, it is easy to see how changing corporate law 
and practice to make it easier for shareholders to benefit at creditors’ 
expense permits a one-time increase in shareholder wealth, while simultane-
ously making it more difficult and expensive for corporations to borrow in 
the future. A similar problem arises when a shift to shareholder primacy 
allows shareholders to exploit other corporate stakeholders. 
Writing alone and with Margaret Blair, the Author has explored else-
where how board-centric governance can encourage nonshareholder stake-
holders to make vital specific investments in corporate production that 
cannot be fully protected by contract or law.55 For example, employees may 
work harder than their formal contracts require, suppliers may allow 
invoices to go unpaid during times of weak cash flow, customers may invest 
time and effort in learning how to use the company’s products, and communities 
may build specialized infrastructure, such as roads or schools, to support the 
 
53 Id.  
54 Id. 
 
55 See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 7, at 74-85; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Pro-
duction Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999) (noting that “boards exist not to 
protect shareholders per se, but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the members of 
the corporate ‘team’”).  
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corporations’ needs. Stakeholders make such specific investments not 
because they are fully protected by law or contract, but because they believe 
a board-governed, managerialist firm will, to some extent, respect their 
contributions and treat them fairly. By contrast, stakeholders rationally 
distrust dispersed shareholders who can personally profit from threatening 
to expropriate or destroy the value of stakeholders’ specific investments. 
This makes it harder for shareholder-focused public corporations to attract 
dedicated employees, loyal customers, cooperative suppliers, and support 
from local communities. Shifting public corporations from the managerial 
model to the shareholder-centric model thus can produce a one-time 
increase in “shareholder wealth,” while simultaneously eroding public 
corporations’ long-term ability to generate profits, just as fishing with 
dynamite produces a one-time increase in catch size while eroding long-
term fishing returns.56 
V. STILL MORE TOXIC SIDE EFFECTS: UNLEASHING  
SHAREHOLDER SHORT-TERMISM 
The previous Part argued that the shift toward shareholder primacy 
exacerbates tensions between shareholders and creditors and further 
worsens economically significant tensions between shareholders’ interests 
and those of stakeholders like employees, customers, and suppliers. In other 
words, shareholder primacy’s negative side effects may operate on a much 
larger scale than either Rock or Adler and Kahan suggest. Yet there is 
another toxic side effect to fear from shareholder primacy—unleashing 
shareholder short-termism. 
Shareholder primacy theory implicitly treats shareholders as a homoge-
neous group with identical interests. In reality, of course, “shareholders” are 
human beings who happen to own shares in public companies. Their 
individual interests can diverge substantially.57 One source of conflict of 
interest among shareholders is differences in the period of time shareholders 
expect to hold their shares. Some shareholders, especially “mom and pop” 
individual investors, buy stocks to invest in long-term goals like retirement 
or paying a child’s college tuition. Others are short-term investors (specula-
tors might be a more accurate description) who hope to reap trading profits 
from stock price movements over periods of weeks, days, or even (in the 
 
56 See STOUT, supra note 7, at 51-52. 
57 See id., at 8-9; see also Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 
53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 577-93 (2006). 
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case of “flash trading” hedge funds) mere seconds.58 There is reason to 
suspect short-term investors want boards to manage corporations in ways 
that are quite different from what longer-term investors prefer. 
In particular, many people in business believe certain strategies can raise 
a company’s share price without necessarily improving, and indeed possibly 
harming, its long-term performance. A large share repurchase program is 
one classic example; cutting or minimizing reported expenses for employee 
salaries, customer support, or research and development is another.59 
Empirical studies of “activist” hedge funds that typically hold shares only 
for a year or so confirm that these are exactly the sorts of corporate strate-
gies they pressure boards to adopt.60 Yet large share repurchase programs 
raise the risk of insolvency. Cutting the budgets for employees, customer 
support, and research and development also threatens a company’s long-
term growth. In either case, managers focusing on next year’s share price 
have less time and energy to spend planning for the next decade. These 
possible negative effects of focusing on share price—which damage not only 
the company’s creditors, employees, customers, and other stakeholders, but 
also its long-term shareholders—do not concern the short-term speculator 
who plans to sell and get out before any damage becomes apparent. 
Accordingly, shifting to a shareholder-centric corporate system increases 
the risk that boards and executives will make more myopic business deci-
sions. The risk is great for at least two reasons. First, institutional investors 
enjoy far more clout in the boardroom than individual investors do, and two 
important categories of institutional investors—actively managed mutual 
funds and hedge funds—are notorious for typically holding shares for only 
one or two years. (The growing dominance of mutual funds and hedge 
funds in the market partly explains why the average holding period for 
stocks listed on U.S. exchanges has declined from eight years in 1960 to 
around four months today.61) Second, the emphasis on “pay for performance” 
also gives executives, whose pay is largely determined by how the stock 
 
58 See Nick Baumann, Too Fast To Fail, MOTHER JONES, Jan.–Feb. 2013, at 36-38 (describing 
flash trading). 
59 See, e.g., Slav Fedorov, Does A Stock Buyback Affect the Price?, MOTLEY FOOL, http://wiki.fool. 
com/Does_a_Stock_Buyback_Affect_the_Price%3F (last visited May 6, 2013) (“A stock buyback 
usually pushes up the price . . . .”). The belief that repurchases raise share price has both 
empirical and theoretical support. See Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? 
Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1252-56 (1990). This effect of 
repurchases helps explain the massive amounts of equity public companies have retired in recent 
years. See Rock, supra note 1, at 1919. 
60 See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1401 (2007) 
(“Activist hedge funds look for . . . free cash, and cuttable costs.”). 
61 STOUT, supra note 7, at 66. 
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performs for the next year or two, personal incentive to focus on short-term 
share prices instead of focusing on the company’s longer-term future. 
While business leaders often complain about short-term pressures,62 
some academics argue that their complaints must be either insincere or 
naïve, because it is impossible to raise a company’s short-term share price 
while harming its long-term prospects.63 According to this argument, the 
stock market will recognize if damage is being done. Adopting destructive 
short-term strategies will cause stock price to decline, punishing any 
management team foolish enough to follow such a course. 
This critique fails for two reasons. First, it relies on an extreme version 
of the once-popular efficient market hypothesis, which, at one time, was 
thought to predict that the market price of a corporation’s shares accurately 
reflected the best possible estimate of the company’s fundamental economic 
value.64 Today this version of the efficient market hypothesis has been 
largely discredited both empirically and theoretically.65 Even shareholder 
primacy advocates now concede that the stock market can over- or under-
value a company’s shares for some period.66 From the perspective of a hedge 
fund manager hoping to profit from flipping shares held for a few months 
or an executive planning to sell vested shares, only a few months of over- or 
underpricing is needed. 
 
62 See, e.g., ASPEN INST. BUS. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A 
CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 
3 (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/images/ 
Overcoming%20Short-termism%20AspenCVSG%2015dec09.pdf (outlining “recommendations to 
focus attention . . . on the intricate problems of short-termism”). 
63 See Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate 
Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655, 668 (1989) (noting how many academic economists dismiss fears of 
managerial myopia as inconsistent with efficient market theory).  
64 See Stout, supra note 21, at 640-41 (discussing the idea of fundamental value efficiency, 
which requires markets to respond “quickly” and “accurately” to “available information”). Today, 
even those who favor the efficient market hypothesis typically adhere to a much weaker “informa-
tional efficiency” version that simply predicts it is difficult to make short-term profits trading on 
publicly available information. See id. at 640-42.  
65 Id. at 667 (“[T]he evidence . . . does not support the close correlation between price and 
value predicted by orthodox efficient markets theory.”). Economist John Quiggin calls the efficient 
market hypothesis a “zombie idea” that is intellectually dead but still exercises influence. See 
generally JOHN QUIGGIN, ZOMBIE ECONOMICS: HOW DEAD IDEAS STILL WALK AMONG US 
35-77 (2010). 
66 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, How To Tie Equity Compensation to Long-
Term Results, 22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 99, 104 (2010) (arguing that pay arrangements that tie 
compensation to share price can lead to loss in long-term value); Michael C. Jensen, The Agency 
Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance, 10 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 549, 553-
554 (2004). 
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Second, it does not really matter whether executives and directors are 
correct in believing they can raise tomorrow’s share price by adopting 
strategies that harm the company later on. Because executives and directors 
(not academics) run corporations, it is what they believe that counts. 
Disturbingly, they seem to believe that keeping the stock price high in the 
short run sometimes requires them to take steps that harm the company in 
the long run. A survey of 401 corporate finance officers found that eighty 
percent said they would cut expenses like marketing or product develop-
ment if necessary to make their reported quarterly earnings targets, even if 
they personally believed this would hurt the company’s long-term perfor-
mance.67  
Of course, the hedge fund manager who plans to sell his or her shares in 
a few months would applaud a CFO’s decision to reject a project that would 
produce profits a few years down the line if necessary to “make the num-
bers” next quarter. But the long-term investor who plans to hold shares for 
years or decades feels differently about the matter. Solving the manager–
shareholder agency cost problem by encouraging managers to “think like 
shareholders” does more than worsen the shareholder–creditor agency 
problem that Rock emphasizes.68 It also creates a new shareholder–
shareholder agency problem when the new shareholder-centric reality causes 
managers to think, in particular, like short-term shareholders.69  
CONCLUSION: IS SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY TOO TOXIC? 
The classic agency cost model of the corporation presumes that the cen-
tral problem to be resolved by corporate law is wayward managers exploit-
ing helpless shareholders. To a large extent, shifts in corporate law and 
practice over the past two decades have solved that problem. Yet in the 
process, these shifts may have created new problems, such as the heightened 
conflict between shareholders and creditors that Rock and Adler and Kahan 
emphasize in their Articles.  
This Response suggests that heightened shareholder–creditor tensions 
may be just the tip of a large and ugly iceberg. At least in theory, moving 
 
67 John R. Graham et al., Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions, 62 FIN. ANALYSTS 
J. 27, 31 fig.4 (2006). 
68 Rock, supra note 1, at 1910 (arguing that if “managers and directors today largely ‘think like 
shareholders,’” then “the shareholder–creditor agency cost problem should return as a central 
concern of corporate law”). 
69 Shareholder primacy worsens other shareholder conflicts as well, including the conflicts 
between diversified and undiversified shareholders and between asocial and prosocial shareholders. 
See STOUT, supra note 7, at 86-102. 
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toward shareholder-centric governance can cause boards and executives to 
try to maximize shareholder wealth by exploiting the specific investments 
not only of creditors, but also of other stakeholders like employees, custom-
ers, and suppliers. It can also drive managers to pursue programs designed 
merely to raise share price, like share repurchases or cutting expenses. Such 
strategies have the potential to increase shareholder wealth in the short 
term. But in theory, they can also harm public corporations’ abilities to 
generate future products and profits, to the collective detriment of creditors, 
employees, consumers, suppliers, and long-term shareholders alike. 
Is there any reason beyond theory to take the possibility of such negative 
side effects seriously? Anyone who follows the financial press should 
conclude the answer is “yes.” For over two decades, our public corporations 
have been taking the shareholder primacy cure, but the patient has only 
gotten sicker. In particular, U.S. public corporations are showing three 
alarming negative symptoms. 
The first symptom is that public companies are no longer performing 
well for the shareholders whom the new shareholder-centric system was 
supposed to benefit.70 After an initial spike in investor returns during the 
1990s bull market, returns from holding public equity in the new “shareholder-
centric reality” have been nearly flat—the “lost decade” of 2000–2009 is 
becoming the lost decade-and-a-half.71 This outcome, of course, is exactly 
the opposite of what shareholder primacy theorists predicted should have 
resulted from the “improvements” to corporate governance made during the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. It is consistent, however, 
with this Response’s hypothesis that moving from a managerial model to a 
shareholder-centric model produces initial increases in shareholder wealth 
followed by poor subsequent returns. 
The second symptom is the recent rapid decline in the number of pub-
licly listed companies. Between 1997 and 2008, the number of corporations 
(both private and public) filing U.S. tax returns increased by more than 
twenty percent.72 During the same period, the number of public companies 
listed on U.S. exchanges declined by nearly forty percent, from 8823 to 
 
70 Roger Martin has calculated that between 1933 and 1976, when Jensen and Meckling pub-
lished their agency cost article, see supra note 8, investors who bought the S&P 500 enjoyed real 
compound annual returns of 7.5% despite the 1973–74 bear market. MARTIN, supra note 9, at 63. 
After 1976, this average dropped to 6.5%. Id.  
71 See MARTIN J. PRING ET AL., INVESTING IN THE SECOND LOST DECADE: A SURVIVAL 
GUIDE FOR KEEPING YOUR PROFITS UP WHEN THE MARKET IS DOWN 1-18 (2012). 
72 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 491 
tbl.744, available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0744.pdf. 
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5401.73 Why are public companies disappearing as quickly as endangered 
species?74 In brief, some public companies (e.g., Enron, Merrill Lynch, 
Countrywide) are collapsing or being acquired after scandals and disasters, 
others (e.g., Dunkin’ Donuts, Toys“R”Us) are voluntarily “going private,” 
and emerging firms are choosing to stay private and not sell shares to public 
investors at all.75 Again, this trend is inconsistent with shareholder primacy 
theory, which predicts that as public corporations become more shareholder-
centric, they should prove more attractive to investors and entrepreneurs 
who are seeking to raise capital. It is consistent, however, with this Response’s 
hypothesis that entrepreneurs recognize that it is becoming too difficult to 
attract stakeholders’ specific contributions and too difficult to make long-
range plans and investments using the public corporation form. 
The third troubling symptom is an alarming decrease in the duration of 
public corporations. It is estimated that the typical Fortune 500 company 
had a life expectancy of seventy-five years early in the twentieth century but 
now has one of only fifteen years (and that number is declining).76 It is too 
easy to dismiss this troubling symptom merely as evidence of “creative 
destruction.”77 Although some businesses (Twitter comes to mind) can 
develop quite rapidly, it takes more than fifteen years to build a great 
consumer brand name, an aerospace industry, or a cutting-edge pharmaceu-
tical firm. And for creative destruction to be creative it must lead to greater 
economic growth, not the economic stagnation we are currently experiencing. 
Correlation is not causation, of course. Defenders of shareholder primacy 
can reasonably argue that reduced investor returns, declining numbers of 
public companies, and the shortening of large corporations’ life expectancies 
can all be explained by other factors, such as global competition, too much 
or too little financial regulation, or creative destruction. In some cases they 
are likely right. Unfortunately, it is impossible to statistically prove what 
causes these kinds of macroeconomic trends. The sample size is too small, 
and the number of variables involved too large. And if we try to judge the 
shareholder-centric model by looking instead to what happens to individual 
companies after they adopt shareholder-friendly “reforms,” we risk making 
 
73 DAVID WEILD & EDWARD KIM, GRANT THORNTON: CAPITAL MARKET SERIES: A 
WAKE-UP CALL FOR AMERICA, 14 exhibit 14 (2009), available at http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/ 
GTCom/Public%20companies%20and%20capital%20markets/gt_wakeup_call_.pdf. 
74 See Rival Versions of Capitalism: The Endangered Public Company, ECONOMIST, May 19, 2012, 
at 13 (noting that public companies are disappearing). 
75 WEILD & KIM, supra note 73, at 1. 
76 See Steven Denning, Why Did IBM Survive?, FORBES (July 10, 2011), http://www.forbes. 
com/sites/stevedenning/2011/07/10/why-did-ibm-survive. 
77 See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942).  
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the same error as an empirical scholar who sees that fishermen who use 
dynamite get more fish in the short run than fishermen who use lines and 
bait, and concludes that everyone should fish with dynamite. From a policy 
perspective, we should care about macroeconomic growth, and not the 
possibility of temporary individual advantage. As every economics student 
familiar with the “Tragedy of the Commons” knows, it is not safe to assume 
the latter always leads to the former.78  
But the absence of solid statistical proof on the causes of macroeconomic 
phenomena does not allow us to escape their effects. Nor does it excuse us 
from choosing how to respond. Whether we wish to or not, we must judge 
as best we can whether shareholder primacy’s benefits from tempering the 
shareholder–manager conflict outweigh its costs in terms of heightening the 
conflict between shareholders and other stakeholders (including but not 
limited to creditors) and the conflict between short- and long-term share-
holders. If we judge the benefits of the shareholder-centric model to be 
large and the costs small, it makes sense to respond as both Rock’s and 
Adler and Kahan’s Articles implicitly assume we ought to respond: not by 
abandoning shareholder primacy but by instead trying to smooth its rough 
edges through ad hoc changes in creditors’ rights and shareholders’ obliga-
tions. This is a conservative approach unlikely to do much harm. 
Yet it may not do much good either. This Response argues that both 
logic and the evidence available suggest that the shareholder primacy cure is 
proving more debilitating to public corporations than the managerial 
disease it was supposed to remedy. Interestingly, many in the business 
world seem to have already reached this conclusion. As already noted, fewer 
private companies are “going public.” But those that do are increasingly 
opting for multi-class share structures that permit managers to retain voting 
control while leaving outside investors essentially powerless.79 One of the 
first and most prominent examples was Google, which went public in 2004 
with a governance structure designed to keep voting power in the hands of 
the firm’s founders and executives.80 By 2009, more than eight percent of 
 
78 See STOUT, supra note 7, at 50-52 (discussing the “investor Tragedy of the Commons”). 
79 See Adam Brown, Calpers Strategy Could Avoid IPOs with Dual Class Structures, INSIDE 
INVESTOR RELATIONS (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.insideinvestorrelations.com/articles/ipos-
private-share-markets/18938/calpers-could-avoid-dual-class-ipos (describing the current “trend toward 
dual class voting structures”). 
80 See 2004 Founder’s IPO: “An Owner’s Manual” for Google’s Shareholders, GOOGLE, 
http://investor.google.com/corporate/2004/ipo-founders-letter.html (last visited May 6, 2013) 
(explaining Google founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin’s justification for Google’s corporate 
structure and executive roles). 
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firms going public had multiple share classes, and, by 2012, this figure had 
risen to more than eleven percent.81 Thus, emerging companies are responding 
to what Rock calls the “new shareholder-centric reality” by adopting what 
the Author has elsewhere labeled “managerialism in the closet.”82 
Friedrich Hayek would hardly be surprised. After all, the shareholder-
centric model sprang from the minds of academics in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and it became business reality in no small part due to the interventions of 
regulators like the IRS and the SEC during the 1990s and beyond. Like 
many market interventions driven by bureaucratic central planning, it has 
proven less than successful at achieving its intended objectives of improving 
corporate behavior and increasing shareholder returns. The market, ever 
resilient, is adjusting and responding. 
Still, it would be helpful if corporate law experts at least would stop lob-
bying to give our ailing public corporations even larger doses of the toxic 
shareholder primacy cure. By announcing that the new shareholder-centric 
reality has arrived, and by pointing out that it creates problems for credi-
tors, Rock and Adler and Kahan may have done the business world and 
business academia a great service. Hayek would be pleased. But one sus-
pects that Hayek might have also wished that they had been bolder and 
questioned the wisdom of the shareholder primacy cure. 
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